Mercer Law Review
Volume 46
Number 4 Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 8

7-1995

Evidence
Marc T. Treadwell

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Treadwell, Marc T. (1995) "Evidence," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 46 : No. 4 , Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol46/iss4/8

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Evidence
by Marc T. Treadweil
I. INTRODUCTION

Inrecent past evidence surveys, the author has suggested, perhaps
presumptuously, that the Eleventh Circuit has markedly decreased its
level of scrutiny of district court evidentiary decisions. It appears that
in most cases, the Eleventh Circuit is willing to defer broadly to the
discretion afforded district judges in evidentiary rulings. As a result, the
number of Eleventh Circuit decisions in which evidentiary issues played
a predominant part has decreased. Decisions rendered by the Eleventh
Circuit during the current survey period suggest that the court is
allocating its resources to evidentiary issues in which appellate guidance
is broadly needed rather than micro-managing the routine evidentiary
decisions of district judges. Thus, while the number of evidentiary
decisions during the current survey period was again "down," the court
issued significant rulings in the areas of privilege and hearsay. The
court, it seems, continues to avoid what had been fertile ground in the
past-the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence under Rules 403 and
404.
II.

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 201: JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
ADJUDICATED FACTS

In United States v. Jones,1 the government sought to recover loans
made to a physician while a medical student.' Upon completion of a
residency program, the physician agreed to serve four years in a rural
practice in exchange for the forgiveness of his student loan debt.3

* Partner in the firm of Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (BA., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1981). Member,

State Bar of Georgia.
1. 29 F.3d 1549 (11th Cir. 1994).
2. Id. at 1550.
3. Id. at 1551.
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However, the health center employing the physician terminated him
prior to the completion of his four year obligation.4 He sued the health
center alleging sex discrimination and retaliatory discharge. A jury
returned a verdict against the physician.'
The government moved for summary judgment in its action to recover
funds loaned to the physician.6 In the summary judgment motion, the
government denied any obligation to reassign the physician to another
hospital because he was dismissed for cause.7 To establish this
contention, the government submitted a copy of the order, entered in the
physician's discrimination suit, denying his motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.' In
this order, the trial judge concluded that the physician was terminated
because of poor attendance and other problems.9 The district court
granted the government's motion relying in part upon the findings of
fact in the order denying the physician's motion. 10
On appeal, the physician argued that this order was inadmissible and,
in its absence, an issue of fact remained for the jury to resolve." The
government argued that the district court acted properly in taking
judicial notice of the order.'2 The Eleventh Circuit first noted that a
fact must be incapable of reasonable dispute before it may be judicially
noticed.' 3 Regarding court orders in particular, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that a court may take judicial notice of a document filed in
another court to establish certain procedural details, but not to establish
the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation.' 4 The court
held that the order at issue did not indisputably establish that the
physician had refused to work. 5 The Eleventh Circuit found judicial
notice of the order was improper and reversed the district court.16

4. Id.

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 1551 n.2.
Id. at 1551.
Id.
Id.

9. Id.at 1551 n.3.
10. Id. at 1551.
11. Id. at 1552.
12. Id. at 1553.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The Eleventh Circuit also held that the order was not admissible pursuant to
FED. R. EVID. 802(8), the Federal Rules' public records exception to the hearsay rule,
because this rule does not include judicial findings of facts. 29 F.3d at 1554.
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III.

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404: CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT
ADMISSIBLE To PROVE CONDUCT: EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES

Rule 4047 is the principal rule of evidence addressing the admissibility of "extrinsic act evidence"--evidence of acts and transactions other
than the one at issue. The rule is intended to prevent the introduction
of propensity evidence--evidence of prior misconduct solely offered to
prove that a defendant is more likely to have committed the charged
offense. Extrinsic act evidence is, however, admissible to prove motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident.'8 To determine the admissibility of extrinsic act
evidence under Rule 404, the Eleventh Circuit uses the test established
in United States v. Beechum. 9 First, the extrinsic act evidence must
be relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character.' Second,
the prosecution must prove the defendant committed the extrinsic act.21
Third, the evidence must not contravene Rule 403.22
In 1991 the Supreme Court of the United States amended Rule 404(b)
to provide that the prosecution must, upon request by a defendant, give
reasonable notice in advance of trial of its intention to present extrinsic
act evidence.' The Eleventh Circuit first interpreted this amendment
in United States v. Perez-Tosta.24 In Perez-Tosta the government
informed the defendant of its intent to use extrinsic act evidence
immediately prior to jury selection. The district court found that the
prosecutor first knew four days prior to the start of trial of the witnesses
who would testify about the extrinsic acts.'
The prosecution had

17. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
18. Id.
19. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
20. 582 F.2d at 911.
21. Id. at 912-13. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681 (1988), the circuit courts of appeal were split on whether the government had
to prove a defendant committed the extrinsic act by clear and convincing evidence or only
by a preponderance of the evidence. In Huddleston, the Supreme Court held that the
preponderance of evidence governed this determination. Id. at 689.
22. 582 F.2d at 911. Rule 403 states the value of the extrinsic act must not be
substantially outweighted by its undue prejudice. FED. R. EviD. 403. Rule 404(b) governs
the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence offered for substantive purposes. FED. R. EVID.
404(b). If the extrinsic act evidence is offered to impeach or bolster a witness, then the
admissibility of the evidence is determined by the rules found in Article VI, principally
Rule 608 which addresses the use of character evidence and evidence of specific incidents
of conduct. FED. R. EVID. 608.
23. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
24. 36 F.3d 1552 (11th Cir. 1994).
25. Id. at 1560.
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notified the defendant of its intent to call these witnesses the next
business day, which was the first day of trial.26 Prosecutors, however,
2
did not intend to call the witnesses until six days later.
Thus, the
district court found that the defendant had six days notice.' Based on
these facts, the district court concluded that the government gave
reasonable notice.29
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit, noting that this was an issue of first
impression, concluded that the determination of whether notice is
reasonable should be based on three factors. 3 First, the district court
should consider the government's motivation and circumstances. 3' The
mere fact that prosecutors learned of the evidence shortly before trial
does not necessarily establish the purity of their motives. The government's failure to prepare its case in a timely manner could have caused
the late discovery of the extrinsic act evidence. Thus, in applying the
first factor, the government is charged with possessing the knowledge
that a timely and reasonable preparation for trial would have revealed
the evidence. Second, the district court should consider the prejudice
that a defendant will suffer because of the allegedly late notice.3
Third, the district court should consider the significance of the evidence
to the government's case.' The court concluded that Rule 404(b) "is a
rule of inclusion, and 404(b) evidence, like other relevant evidence,
should8 not lightly be excluded when it is central to the prosecution's
case."
Applying these three factors, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
district court properly admitted the extrinsic act evidence.35 The court
attached particular significance to the defendant's failure to point to
specific actions he would have taken had he earlier known of the
government's intent to use extrinsic act evidence.3'
Thus, merely
arguing that notice was inexcusably late will not support a finding of
inadmissibility with respect to extrinsic act evidence. Defendants must
establish why admission of the evidence would prejudice their case. In
the context of this issue, defendants should be prepared to show what

26. Id.
27.

Id.

28. Id.
29. Id.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1561.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1562.
Id. at 1562-63.
Id. at 1562.
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steps they would have taken if given more time to counter or ameliorate
the evidence.
Frequently, defendants anxious to prevent the admission of extrinsic
act evidence will offer to stipulate to a particular fact or element of an
offense. An effective stipulation to the point the government seeks to
prove through the admission of extrinsic act evidence renders the
evidence irrelevant. As demonstrated in United States v. Taylor,37 this
tactic is more effective in theory than in practice. In Taylor the
defendant argued on appeal that the district court improperly admitted
extrinsic act evidence, given his offer to stipulate to intent. ' The
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that a proper stipulation may render
extrinsic act evidence inadmissible but, on the facts of the case, found
the defendant's offer insufficient.39 In addition to intent, the government used the extrinsic act evidence to prove knowledge, motive, and
absence of mistake.' The defendant offered to stipulate that he had
the intent to traffic in drugs. 41 The government, however, used the
evidence to prove his intent to join a conspiracy.4 2 Thus, the defendant's offer did not entirely eliminate the need for the extrinsic act
evidence. As a practical matter, a defendant may have difficulty
stipulating intent to conspire to buy and sell drugs, knowledge, motive,
and the absence of any reasonable grounds for mistake, while still
proclaiming his innocence.
Finally, in United States v. Clemons," the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that if extrinsic act evidence is used to prove identity-that the
defendant was the perpetrator of the charged offense-the prior offenses
must be so similar as to mark "the offenses as the handiwork of the
accused."'
IV. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 501: PRIVILEGES

The Federal Rules of Evidence, rather than undertaking the daunting
task of formulating rules that recognize and define various evidentiary
privileges, yield to the courts and allow the Federal Judiciary to

37.

17 F.3d 333 (11th Cir. 1994).

38. Id. at 338-39.
39. Id. at 339.

40. Id.
41.

Id.

42. Id.
43. 32 F.3d 1504 (11th Cir. 1994).
44. Id. at 1508.
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formulate such rules in nondiversity cases.' In diversity cases, state
law determines the existence of privileges.'
4 7 local union
In Cox v. Administrator United States Steel & Carnegie
members filed suit against their union and their employer alleging
misconduct on the part of the union and the employer during collective
bargaining.'
The union members sought discovery of information
contained in communications between the union and its attorneys and
the employer and its attorneys.49 The district court, relying on the
Garner doctrine," held that the plaintiffs could discover communications between the union president and the union's attorneys.51 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that, in some situations,
shareholders can discover otherwise privileged communications between
corporate management and corporate attorneys based on the management's obligation to manage the corporation for the benefit of stockholders."2 However, the Garner doctrine does not totally abrogate the
attorney-client privilege simply because the party suing the corporation
happens to be a stockholder. Rather, the stockholder must show
adequate cause.' The union argued that the Garner doctrine should
not apply to unions." The district court rejected this argument,
concluding that the relationship between corporate management and
stockholders was no different, from a fiduciary standpoint, than the
relationship between union management and union members.' The
Eleventh Circuit did not address this issue. Rather it held that,
assuming the Garner doctrine applied, the plaintiffs had not shown
sufficient cause to pierce the attorney-client privilege." Although the
court acknowledged that several of the nine factors enumerated in
Garner supported the plaintiffs' position, two of the factors were
sufficient to outweigh the remaining factors.5 7 First, the plaintiffs

45. FED. R. EviD. 503.
46. Id.
47. 17 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir. 1994).
48. Id. at 1392-93.
49. Id. at 1395.
50. Id. at 1413-14. In Garnerv. Wolfinbarger,430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), the court
held that shareholders suing their corporation may discover privileged attorney-client
communications between management and corporate attorneys upon a showing of good
cause. Id. at 1103-04.
51. 17 F.3d at 1415.
52.

Id. at 1414.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 1415.
Id.
Id. at 1415-16.
Id. at 1415.
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constituted only a small percentage of the total union membership."
Second, the interests of the plaintiffs were contrary to the interests of all
other union members. 9 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
district court.'
The plaintiffs also argued that they were entitled to discover these
communications pursuant to the crime-fraud exception to the attorneyclient privilege." The crime-fraud exception allows the discovery of
attorney-client communications if the party seeking the discovery: (1)
makes a prima facie showing that the client was engaged in or planning
criminal or fraudulent conduct when he sought the advice of counsel, or
that the client committed a crime or fraud after receiving his attorney's
advice; and (2) proves that the client sought the attorney's assistance in
furtherance of the criminal or fraudulent activity.6 2 The Eleventh
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' crime-fraud exception argument because
of the absence of any evidence that the union leaders' communications
with their attorneys either furthered or were closely related to any
criminal or fraudulent conduct."
In Cox the district court also permitted discovery of communications
between the employer's management and their attorneys.6 " The district
court held that the employer waived the attorney-client privilege by
taking the position that it "'believed the policy [in question] to be
lawful."' This position, the district court reasoned, "'necessarily
implicates all of the information at [the employer's] disposal."' The
employer could not take this position and then shield from discovery
documents relevant to the question of whether it knew that its conduct
was lawful.6 7 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district
court that if the employer raised an issue that required the examination
of otherwise privileged communications, then it waived the attorneyclient privilege." The employer argued that it had simply denied
allegations made by the plaintiffs and did not affirmatively waive the

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
1987).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1423-24.
Id. at 1416.
Id. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir.
17 F.3d at 1417.
Id. at 1418.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1419.
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privilege," The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, concluding that when the
employer took the position that it believed its conduct was lawful and in
good faith, it went further than merely denying an allegation."0 Having
taken this position, the plaintiffs were entitled to information relevant
to the employer's assertion, even if this information was contained in
otherwise privileged attorney-client communications.
V. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 608: EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND
CONDUCT OF WITNESSES

Rule 6087' provides that witnesses cannot be impeached or bolstered
by extrinsic evidence of specific instances of prior conduct by the
witness. 72 A witness, however, can be examined about specific instances of conduct if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.7 8 In AdVantage Telephone Directory Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories
Corp.,7 making its third appearance in the Eleventh Circuit, the
Eleventh Circuit held that a magistrate judge improperly applied Rule
608(b) by permitting questioning on cross-examination regarding specific
instances of conduct that were not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness."6 In Ad-Vantage, the defendant cross-examined the plaintiff's
expert about bankruptcy and disciplinary proceedings brought by the
Florida Bar Association ("Bar") and the American and Florida Institutes
of Certified Public Accountants ("Institutes") against the expert.7" The
Bar inquiry yielded a finding of probable cause that the expert had
violated ethical rules, but no sanctions were levied.77 Instead, the
expert resigned from the Bar.7 . The Institutes found no probable
cause. 9 The defendant also cross-examined the expert about his
censure by the Florida Board of Accountancy in 1969 for "over-reliance
on a partner's work.' °
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the type of conduct contemplated by
Rule 608(b) as probative of untruthfulness includes forgery, perjury, and

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1418.
Id. at 1419.
FED. R. EVID. 608.
Id.
Id.
37 F.3d 1460 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1464.
Id. at 1463.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fraud. 8' The court held that bankruptcy and borrowing money from
clients were irrelevant to the expert's truthfulness. 2 "To infer untruthfulness from any unethical act 'paves the way to the exception which will
swallow the Rule." 3 The Institutes' inquiry, which found no probable
cause to believe the expert had committed forgery, was not a proper
subject of cross-examination."' The 1969 inquiry was too remote and,
in any event, was not probative of untruthfulness, but rather was
probative of professional competency.8' The Bar inquiry, although
resulting in a finding of probable cause, did not result in a formal
finding of guilt." The court found that because "the allegations of
wrong doing were grave but no sanctions resulted, the danger was great
that the jury would infer more from the investigation than was fairly
inferable."8' Therefore, the prejudicial effect of questions about the
inquiry outweighed their probative value, and thus, were improper under
Rule 403.' Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and ordered a
new trial.8 9
VI.

ARTICLE VII: EXPERT TESTIMONY

As discussed in last year's survey of Eleventh Circuit evidence
decisions," the Supreme Court held in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc."1 that the Federal Rules of Evidence preempted
decades of court decisions governing the admission of expert testimony. 2 Because Daubert did not enunciate a "definitive checklist or test,"
but rather structured a loose framework to be applied by district
judges,93 the true effect of the decision will likely be unknown until
decisions make their way up the appellate ladder. In United States v.
Lee,"' however, the Eleventh Circuit resolved one issue. Because
81. Id. at 1464.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 608[05 at 608-49
(1994)).

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 1464-65.
Id. at 1464.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1466. Also during the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit applied Rule 608(b)

in United States v. Crutchfield,26 F.3d 1098 (lth Cir. 1994), a case perhaps more notable

for the vigorous tongue lashing of the prosecutor.
90. Marc T. Treadwell, Euidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1291, 1298-99 (1994).
91. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).

92. Id. at 2793.
93. Id. at 2796.
94. 25 F.3d 997 (11th Cir. 1994).
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Daubert was decided after the trial in Lee, the Eleventh Circuit
remanded Lee to the district court for reconsideration of whether the
court properly admitted evidence of results from a relatively new
procedure that purportedly revealed trace amounts of cocaine on the
defendant's clothing."5 The Eleventh Circuit did, however, address the
merits of the defendant's contention that Daubert only applied to the
admission of expert testimony and not to the admission of results of
specialized technical equipment. 6 The Eleventh Circuit held that the
results of specialized technical equipment are admissible only through
the testimony of an expert witness and that the standard controlling
admission of evidence from experts applies to evidence from machines.9
Moreover, in Daubert,the Supreme Court listed the "'known or potential
rate of error'" of the scientific techniques at issue as a relevant factor."
The Eleventh Circuit clearly concluded that this factor applied to
machines designed to perform tests. 9
VII. ARTICLE XIII: HEARSAY
During the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit rendered two
significant decisions addressing the inherent conflict between the
admission of hearsay evidence and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment."° If the out of court statement of an unavailable declarant is admitted into evidence, the defendant will not "be confronted with
the witnesses against him." 1 For a number of years, the Supreme
0 2 was interpreted
Court's landmark decision in Ohio v. Roberts"
to
provide that the Sixth Amendment imposed two limitations on the use
of hearsay evidence." 3 First, hearsay evidence is not admissible
unless the prosecution proves the declarant is unavailable.",° Second,
the hearsay statement must bear "adequate 'indicia of reliability.'"0 5
Although many courts continue to cite Roberts for the proposition that
both elements must be satisfied before hearsay evidence can be admitted
in criminal cases, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have eroded the

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 999.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2786).
Id.

amend. VI.

100.

U.S. CONST.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id. at 66.
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unavailability requirement. In United States v. Inadi,'" the Supreme
Court concluded that Roberts does not stand for the blanket proposition
that "no out-of-court statement can be introduced.., without a showing
that the declarant is unavailable." 7 In Inadi the Court held the
Confrontation Clause does not require a showing of unavailability as a
prerequisite to the admission of a coconspirator's statement under Rule
801(d)(2)(E).'08 With regard to the reliability requirement, the Supreme Court held in Bourjaily v. United States'°9 that the requisite
indicia of reliability could be assumed if the evidence "'falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception.'" 1 If the hearsay evidence at issue
does not fall within such an exception to the hearsay rule, the circumstances surrounding the statements have to be examined to determine
if the statement is sufficiently trustworthy.'
In this event, the
reliability of a statement cannot be established by corroborating
evidence, but rather the statement "must possess indicia of reliability by
virtue of its inherent trustworthiness.""1
The Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue in United States v.
Deeb."n In Deeb the district court admitted testimony of a coconspirator given at a prior trial at which the defendant was not present."4
On appeal, the government argued that this testimony was admissible
under three exceptions to the hearsay rule. First, the government
argued that the testimony was admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as a
prior statement by a witness offered at a subsequent proceeding to rebut
an express or implied charge of recent fabrication."' The Eleventh
Circuit summarily rejected this as a basis for the admission of the
statement because the rule obviously contemplates that the declarant is
available at the subsequent proceeding and subject to cross-examination." 6 Second, the government argued that the testimony was
admissible under Rule 804(b)(1) as former testimony."7 The govern-

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

475 U.S. 387 (1986).
Id. at 394.
Id. at 398-99.
483 U.S. 171 (1987).
Id. at 183 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990).

112.

Id. at 822.

113. 13 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1994).
114. Id. at 1533.
115. Id. at 1534.
116. Id. at 1534-35. The government argued that the declarant was available because
defendant was represented at a pretrial deposition of the declarant. However, the
declarant was not deposed about his testimony at the first trial. Id.
117. Id. at 1535.
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ment argued that the requirement of this Rule, that the party against
whom the testimony is offered have had an opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant, was satisfied because other codefendants with similar
interests had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant." s The
Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument because it was not willing to
hold that former testimony may be admitted in a criminal case if
another party with similar interests cross-examines the witness at the
prior trial." 9 Finally, the government argued, and this time the court
agreed, that the testimony was admissible under Rule 804(b)(5), the
residual exception to the hearsay rule for situations in which the
declarant is unavailable.12 In response, defendant raised what has
been termed the "near miss argument,"121 arguing that Rule 804(b)(5)
expressly applies only to statements "'not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions,'"1 22 and that the testimony in question was
covered by Rule 804(b)(1), the exception for former testimony."
Because the testimony was not admissible under Rule 804(b)(1), the
defendant argued that the government should not be allowed to turn to
the residual exception to gain its admission. 2 The Eleventh Circuit
disagreed."~ If the proffered evidence does not meet all the requirements for admission in Rules 804(b)(1) through 804(b)(4), then it is not
"specifically covered" by those rules and therefore courts may consider
its admissibility under Rule 804(b)(5). 26
Having found a rule warranting the admission of the prior testimony,
the court turned to the constitutional issues raised by the admission of
the evidence.12 7 The court applied the Roberts test and thus had to
determine, first, whether the declarant was unavailable and, second,
whether the testimony was sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.1 28 Because the evidence was only admissible under Rule
804(b)(5), the residual exception, it did not fall within a firmly rooted
118. Id.

119. Id. Rule 804(b)(1) specifically allows the admission of prior testimony in civil
cases if the party against whom the testimony is offered, or a predecessor in interest with
similar motives, had an opportunity to cross examine the declarant. FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(1).
120. 13 F.3d at 1536.
121. Id. at 1536-37.
122. Id. at 1536 (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir.
1990)); FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5).
123. 13 F.3d at 1536.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1537.
128. Id.
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hearsay exception and thus could not be deemed reliable.' Therefore,
the court examined in detail the prior testimony to determine its
reliability.' 0 The government argued that sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness existed because the testimony was under oath, it was
incriminating, and the coconspirator was subject to cross-examination by
the codefendants.' 3 ' The Eleventh Circuit focused primarily on the
nature and extent of the cross-examination of the coconspirator at the
prior trial.31 2 This issue was critical. If the former testimony were
treated as though the coconspirator had not been subject to crossexamination, the court noted, it would probably hold its admission to be
error. 33 First, the court addressed the defendant's argument that
although the coconspirator had been cross-examined, the cross-examination was not read into evidence at his trial. 1' 4 The court rejected this
argument, reasoning that a defendant could not render prior testimony
inadmissible by simply failing to tender the declarant's testimony on
cross-examination.' s The court then held that the prior cross-examination may serve as the functional equivalent of cross-examination by
the defendant if two conditions are met. 3 6 First, the declarant's
motive or inducement to lie must have been probed during crossexamination." 7 Second, the absence of opportunity to cross-examine
the witness personally must not have deprived the defendant of an
opportunity to present evidence that would have undermined the
probative value of the declarant's testimony against him. "s The court
held that the cross-examination of the declarant by his codefendants
satisfied this test. 9
In United States v. Ross,'40 the Eleventh Circuit addressed for the
first time the issue of whether testimony admitted pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3505," which provides for the admissibility of foreign records of

129. Id. at 1538.
130. Id. at 1540.
131. Id. at 1538.
132. Id. at 1539.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1541. The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that cross-examination by
codefendants with similar interests was sufficient to satisfy the reliability requirement of
the Confrontation Clause, while Rule 804(bXl) does not allow the admission of former
testimony in a criminal case, is no doubt exasperating to defendants.
140. 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 1994).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3505 (1985).
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regularly conducted activity, violates the Confrontation Clause.' 42 The
statute is similar to the business records exception found in the Federal
Rules of Evidence except that it provides that a "foreign certification
under this section shall authenticate such record or duplicate.""4
Applying the Roberts test, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the
reliability requirement.'" First, the court noted that the statute,
although similar to Rule 803(6), which clearly qualifies as a firmly
rooted exception of the hearsay rule, was different in a critical respect
because the custodian of the record was not subject to cross-examination. 4 5 Accordingly, the court concluded that the statute could not
qualify as a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 4 ' Thus, the court
examined the records to determine whether they bore sufficient indicia
of reliability to satisfy the trustworthiness requirement of Roberts,
notwithstanding the fact that the statute was not a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. 47 The court agreed with every other circuit that
has considered this issue and concluded that the records were sufficiently reliable because no evidence existed to show that the custodians had
a motive to distort or alter the records, and the custodian had, in the
face of criminal penalties, sworn that the records were kept in the
ordinary course of business. 4" Cross-examination by the defendant
would not have altered the reliability of the records. 49 Moreover, if
the defendant had felt the records were inaccurate, he could have
deposed the custodian. 5 '
In United States v. Brown,"' a prosecution for the possession of

firearm by a convicted felon, the district court admitted into evidence a
police property room receipt. 5 2 The police issued the receipt for a
weapon they found, but the weapon had been routinely destroyed prior
to the defendant's trial.5 3 The defendant contended that the government failed to establish that the receipt was kept in the regular course
of business and therefore was not admissible under the business records

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

33 F.3d at 1515.
18 U.S.C. § 3505(aX2) (1988).
33 F.3d at 1516.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1517.
Id.
Id.
Id.
9 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 909.
Id. at 911.
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exception.' The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, noting that
a custodian properly established a foundation for the admission of
business records as required by Rule 803(6)."'5 The defendant also
argued that the business records exception cannot be used as a "back
door" to introduce law enforcement records that are specifically made
The court rejected this argument
inadmissible by Rule 803(8)(B).'
as well, noting that Congress intended to use the law enforcement
exception to the public records exception to prevent the admission of
records from adversarial relationships between law enforcement officials
and defendants in criminal proceedings."5 7 In such a situation, the
bias of law enforcement officials may be reflected in their reports and
records. If the record in question was prepared in a routine, nonadversarial setting, however, then it does not implicate the concerns raised by
the law enforcement exception. The property receipt in question was not
prepared in a setting in which a law enforcement officer would have a
motivation to do anything other than to properly record pertinent factual
information. Because there was no reason to doubt the reliability of this
recording of routine events, the law enforcement exception to the public
records exception to the hearsay rule did not prohibit its admission into
evidence.'
In United States v. Agustino-Hernandez,5 9 the Eleventh Circuit held
that, upon proof of a proper foundation, Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS") records pertaining to a particular alien are admissible
pursuant to the public records exception found in Rule 803(8)."6 The
court rejected the defendant's argument that such INS files are not
admissible because they contain observations of law enforcement officials
in a criminal case.'' Although, as discussed above, some law enforcement records are not admissible under Rule 808(8), the Eleventh Circuit
noted that if the records are "'prepared in a routine non-adversarial setting'" then they are admissible."6 2 The court concluded that the INS
records satisfied this requirement.6 3

154. Id.
155. Id. at 911 n.4.
156. Id. at 907. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B). The public records exception to the hearsay
rule specifically excludes in "criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other
law enforcement personnel." 9 F.3d at 907.
157. 9 F.3d at 911-12.

158. Id.
159.

14 F.3d 42 (11th Cir. 1994).

160. Id. at 43.
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 9 F.3d 907, 911 (11th Cir. 1993)).
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The Eleventh Circuit also addressed Rule 804(b)(5) in United States
v. Munoz,'' holding that the lower court properly admitted deposit
slips and a check application form pursuant to the residual exception to
the hearsay rule. 5' The defendant contended that the elements of
Rule 804(b)(5) had not been satisfied because the government had not
demonstrated that the declarant, the bank custodian, was unavailable.' " The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, noting that the defendant was
actually the declarant because two of the deposit slips were actually
signed by him and a third, although not signed by him, amounted to a
"statement by him that the third deposit was made to his account.""6 7
Because the defendant did not testify and the government could not
compel him to testify, he Was unavailable." Therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the district court properly applied Rule 804(b)(5).' 69
Rule 804(b)(3) provides for the admission of statements against penal
interest.17 In United States v. Costa,'' the district court relied upon
Rule 804(b)(3) to admit a custodial confession of the defendant's alleged
coconspirator.172 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused on whether
the statement was genuinely against the coconspirator's penal interest."'3 First, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court had not
conducted a proper evaluation of the confession. 7 4 The mere fact that
the statement inculpated the coconspirator did not render it admissible
against the defendant. As the Advisory Committee Notes point out, a
custodial statement by a codefendant implicating himself and other
codefendants may well be intended "to curry favor with the authorities
and hence fail to qualify as against interest."'
Thus, the court must

164. 16 F.3d 1116 (11th Cir. 1994).
165. Id. at 1122.
166. Id. at 1121.
167. Id. at 1116.
168. Id. If defendant was the declarant, the documents arguably would have been
admissible pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 801(dX2)(A) which provides that a statement is not
hearsay if it is the statement of the party against whom it is offered. See FED. R. EVID.
801(dX2XA).
169. 16 F.3d at 1121. The Eleventh Circuit also held that the documents had been

properly authenticated notwithstanding the absence of testimony by a bank official. Id. at
1120-21. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that the
documents were authenticated by their appearance, by defendant's signatures, and by the
fact that the documents were retained by defendant in his possession. Id. at 1121.
170. FED. R. EVID. 804(bX3).
171. 31 F.3d 1073 (11th Cir. 1994).
172. Id. at 1077.
173.
174.

Id.
Id. at 1077-78.

175.

FED. R. EVID. 804(bX3), advisory committee notes.
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examine such statements with exacting scrutiny. 76 Reviewing the
pertinent testimony line by line, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a
portion of the testimony implicating the defendant was not against the
coconspirator's interest, and therefore the court should not have
admitted it.'77 Although other portions of the testimony did implicate
the coconspirator, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the confession was
made only after authorities informed the coconspirator that he would be
imprisoned for life and that prosecutors would help him only after he
provided substantial assistance. 78 Moreover, the confession may have
Therefore, the
resulted from anger over the failure of the venture.'
Eleventh Circuit held that the "custodial confession is not genuinely
against [the coconspirator's] interest to the extent that it directly
inculpates the defendants in a conspiracy, and thus is not admissible
under 804(b)(3)." *s Given the stringent analysis in Costa, custodial
confessions by a coconspirator implicating a defendant are unlikely to
ever be admitted against the defendant pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3).
VIII.

ARTICLE X: CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, AND
PHOTOGRAPHS

The best evidence rule of the Federal Rules of Evidence is found in the
Although the best evidence rule
eight rules set forth in Article X.'
is often cited as the basis for any objection to the use of a copy of a
document or to testimony related to a document, the actual application
of the best evidence rule is very narrow, as demonstrated by the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Swann. 182 In
Allstate the defendant contended that the plaintiffs misrepresented
material facts in their application for insurance and therefore could not
recover for their fire loss.183 As is typical in material misrepresentation cases, the defendant sought to illicit testimony from its underwriter
that, pursuant to the company's underwriting guidelines, he would not
have issued the policy as applied for had he been aware of certain
facts.'
Plaintiffs, however, objected to this testimony on the grounds
that it amounted to testimony about the defendant's written underwrit-

176. 31 F.3d at 1079.
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ing guidelines and the best evidence of these guidelines was the
guidelines themselves."
The court sustained this objection.18 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 7 The court held Rule 1002
only requires the production of an original document when a party is
seeking to prove the content of the writing.'
The mere fact that
testimony relates to a document does not mean that the document must
be produced in lieu of the testimony. Although the underwriter was
testifying in partial reliance on the underwriting guidelines, he was not
attempting to prove the contents of the document. 89
The Eleventh Circuit faced a more complicated best evidence rule issue
in United States v. Ross."0 In Ross the district court admitted transcripts of conversations recorded by Spanish law enforcement officers.' 9 '
The tapes of the conversation had been routinely destroyed. 9 2
The defendant contended that the transcripts were
admitted in violation of the best evidence rule.' 93 Because the tapes
had been destroyed, the Eleventh Circuit turned to Rule 1004 which
provides for the admissibility of copies of a document or recording when
the original has been lost or destroyed.9 4 The Eleventh Circuit first
noted that the original tapes had been destroyed and were unavailable
through no fault of the government.' 95 The Eleventh Circuit held that
a transcript of a tape recording, however, can be used to prove the
contents of the recording.9 8 Finally, the defendant had an opportunity
to attack the accuracy of the transcripts. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
held the transcripts were properly admitted. 97
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